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Maximizing Algebraic Connectivity of Constrained Graphs in
Adversarial Environments
Tor Anderson Chin-Yao Chang Sonia Martı´nez
Abstract—This paper aims to maximize algebraic connec-
tivity of networks via topology design under the presence of
constraints and an adversary. We are concerned with three
problems. First, we formulate the concave-maximization topol-
ogy design problem of adding edges to an initial graph, which
introduces a nonconvex binary decision variable, in addition
to subjugation to general convex constraints on the feasible
edge set. Unlike previous approaches, our method is justifiably
not greedy and is capable of accommodating these additional
constraints. We also study a scenario in which a coordinator
must selectively protect edges of the network from a chance of
failure due to a physical disturbance or adversarial attack. The
coordinator needs to strategically respond to the adversary’s ac-
tion without presupposed knowledge of the adversary’s feasible
attack actions. We propose three heuristic algorithms for the
coordinator to accomplish the objective and identify worst-case
preventive solutions. Each algorithm is shown to be effective in
simulation and their compared performance is discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Motivation. Multi-agent systems are pervasive in new
technology spaces such as power networks with distributed
energy resources like solar and wind, mobile sensor net-
works, and large-scale distribution systems. In such systems,
communication amongst agents is paramount to the propa-
gation of information, which often lends itself to robustness
and stability of the system. Network connectivity is well
studied from a graph-theoretic standpoint, but the problem
of designing topologies when confronted by engineering
constraints or adversarial attacks is not well addressed by
current works. We are motivated to study the NP-hard graph
design problem of adding edges to an initial topology and
to develop a method to solve it which has both improved
performance and allows for direct application to the afore-
mentioned constrained and adversarial settings.
Literature Review. The classic paper [7] by Miroslav
Fiedler proposes a scalar metric for the algebraic connec-
tivity of undirected graphs, which is given by the second-
smallest eigenvalue of the graph Laplacian and is also re-
ferred to as the Fiedler eigenvalue. One of the main problems
we are interested in studying is posed in [8], where the
authors develop a heuristic for strategically adding edges
to an initial topology to maximize this eigenvalue. Lower
and upper bounds for the Fiedler eigenvalue with respect to
adding a particular edge are found; however, the work is
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limited in that their approach is greedy and may not perform
well in some cases. In addition, the proposed strategy does
not address how to handle additional constraints that may be
imposed on the network, such as limits on nodal degree or
restricting costlier edges. The authors of [1] aim to solve the
problem of maximizing connectivity for a particular robotic
network scenario in the presence of an adversarial jammer,
although the work does not sufficiently address scenarios
with a more general adversary who may not be subject to
dynamical constraints. The Fiedler eigenvector, which has a
close relationship to the topology design problem, is studied
in [11]. Many methods to compute this eigenvector exist,
such as the cascadic method in [12]. However, these papers
do not fully characterize how this eigenvector evolves from
adding or removing edges from the network, which is largely
unanswered by the literature. The authors of [6] study the
spectra of randomized graph Laplacians, and [13] gives a
means to estimate and maximize the Fiedler eigenvalue in
a mobile sensor network setting. However, neither of these
works consider the problem from a design perspective. In
the celebrated paper by Goemans and Williamson [10], the
authors develop a relaxation and performance guarantee on
solving the MAXCUT problem, which has not yet been
adapted for solving the topology design problem. Each of [5],
[2] survey existing results related to the Fiedler eigenvalue
and contain useful references.
Statement of Contributions. This paper considers three
optimization problems and has two main contributions. First,
we formulate the concave-maximization topology design
problem from the perspective of adding edges to an ini-
tial network, subject to general convex constraints plus an
intrinsic binary constraint. We then pose a scenario where
a coordinator must strategically select links to protect from
random failures due to a physical disturbance or malicious
attack by a strategic adversary. In addition, we formulate
this problem from the adversary’s perspective. Our first
main contribution is a method to solve the topology design
problem (and, by extension, the protected links problem). We
develop a novel MAXCUT-inspired SDP relaxation to handle
the binary constraint, which elegantly considers the whole
problem in a manner where previous greedy methods fall
short. Our next main contribution returns to the coordinator-
adversary scenario. We first discuss the nonexistence of a
Nash equilibrium in general. This motivates the development
of an optimal preventive strategy in which the coordinator
makes an optimal play with respect to any possible response
by the adversary. We rigorously prove several auxiliary
results about the solutions of the adversary’s computation-
ally hard concave-minimization problem in order to justify
heuristic algorithms which may be used by the coordinator to
search for the optimal preventive strategy. A desirable quality
of these algorithms is they do not presuppose the knowledge
of the adversary’s feasibility set, nor the capability of solving
her problem. Rather, the latter two algorithms observe her
plays over time and use these against her construct an
effective preventive solution. Simulations demonstrate the ef-
fectiveness of our SDP relaxation for topology design and the
performance of the preventive-solution seeking algorithms
when applied to the adversarial link-protection problem.
II. PRELIMINARIES
This section establishes some notation and preliminary
concepts which will be drawn upon throughout the paper.
A. Notation
We denote by R the set of real numbers. The notation
x ∈ Rn and A ∈ Rn×m indicates an n-dimensional real
vector and an n-by-m-dimensional real matrix, respectively.
The gradient of a real-valued multivariate function f :
R
n → R with respect to a vector x ∈ Rn is written
∇xf(x). The ith component of a vector x is indicated by
xi, all components of x not including the i
th component
is indicated by x−i, and the (i, j)
th element of a matrix A
is indicated by Aij . The standard inner product is written
〈x, y〉 = x⊤y and the Euclidean norm of a vector x is
denoted ‖x‖2 =
√
〈x, x〉. The closed Euclidean ball of
radius ε centered at a point x is expressed as Bε(x). Two
vectors x and y are perpendicular if 〈x, y〉 = 0, indicated
by x ⊥ y, and the orthogonal complement to a span of
vectors ai is written span{ai}⊥, meaning x ⊥ y, ∀x ∈
span{ai}, ∀y ∈ span{ai}⊥. Elementwise multiplication is
represented by x ⋄ y = (x1y1, . . . , xnyn)⊤. A symmetric
matrix A ∈ Rn×n has n real eigenvalues ordered as λ1 ≤
· · · ≤ λn, sometimes written λi(A) if clarification is needed,
with associated eigenvectors v1, . . . , vn that are assumed to
be of unit magnitude unless stated otherwise. A positive
semi-definite matrix A is indicated by A  0. We denote
componentwise inequality as x  y. The notation 0n and
1n refers to the n-dimensional vectors of all zeros and all
ones, respectively. We use the notation In := In −
1n1
⊤
n
n
and refer to this matrix as a pseudo-identity matrix; note that
null (In) = span{1n}. The operator diag for vector argu-
ments produces a diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements
are the entries of the vector. The empty set is denoted ∅ and
the cardinality of a finite set S is denoted |S|. We express
the m Cartesian product of sets by means of a superscript
m, such as [si, si]
m ⊂ Rm, where si, si ∈ R. Probabilities
and expectations are indicated by P and E, respectively.
B. Graph Theory
We refer to [9] as a supplement for the concepts we
describe throughout this subsection. In multi-agent engi-
neering applications, it is useful to represent a network
mathematically as a graph G = (N , E) whose node set
is given by N = {1, . . . , n} and edge set E ⊆ N ×N ,
| E | = m, which represents a physical connection or ability
to transmit a message between agents. We refer to the set of
nodes that node i is connected to as its set of neighbors,
N i ⊂ N . We consider undirected graphs so (i, j) ∈ E
indicates j ∈ N i and i ∈ N j . The graph has an associated
Laplacian matrix L ∈ Rn×n, whose elements are
Lij =

−1, j ∈ N i, j 6= i,
| N i |, j = i,
0, otherwise.
Note that L  0. It is well known that the multiplicity
of the zero eigenvalue is equal to the number of connected
components in the graph [9]. To expand on this, connected
graphs have a one-dimensional null space associated with
the eigenvector 1n. The incidence matrix of L is given by
E ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n×m, where the lth column of E, given by
el ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n, is associated with an edge l ∼ (i, j). In
particular, the ith element of el is −1, the j th element is
1, and all other elements are zero. A vector x ∈ {0, 1}m
encodes the (dis)connectivity of the edges. In this sense, for
l ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, xl = 0 indicates l is disconnected and xl =
1 indicates l is connected. Then, L = E diag(x)E⊤.
C. Set Theory
A limit point p of a set P is a point such that any
neighborhood Bε(p) contains a point p
′ ∈ P . A set is closed
if it contains all of its limit points, it is bounded if it is
contained in a ball of finite radius, and it is compact if it
is both closed and bounded. Let Ai = {p | a⊤i p ≥ bi}
be a closed half-space and P = A1 ∩ · · · ∩ Ar ⊂ R
m be
a finite intersection of closed half-spaces. If P is compact,
we refer to it as a polytope. Consider a set of points F =
{p ∈ P | a⊤i p = bi, i ∈ I ⊆ {1, . . . , r}; a
⊤
j p ≥ bj, j ∈
{1, . . . , r}\I}. Let h = dim(span{ai}) be the dimension of
the subspace spanned by the vectors {ai}i∈I . Then, we refer
to F as an (m − h)-dimensional face of P . Lastly, denote
the affine hull of F as aff(F) = {p + w | p, w ∈ Rm, p ∈
F , w ⊥ span{ai}i∈I} and define the relative interior of F
as relint(F) = {p | ∃ε > 0 : Bε(p) ∩ aff(F) ⊂ F}.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENTS
This section formulates the three optimization problems
that we study. The first problem aims to add edges to an
initial topology to maximize algebraic connectivity of the
final graph. The second problem introduces a coordinator
who is charged with protecting some links in a network that
are subject to an external disturbance or attack. The third
problem takes the opposite approach of the latter problem by
minimizing connectivity from an adversarial point of view.
A. Topology Design for Adding Edges
Consider a network of agents with some initial (possibly
disconnected) graph topology characterized by an edge set
E0 and Laplacian L0. We would like to add k edges to E0,
possibly subject to some additional convex constraints, so
as to maximize the Fiedler eigenvalue of the final Laplacian
L⋆. This problem is well motivated: the Fiedler eigenvalue
dictates convergence rate of many first-order distributed
algorithms such as consensus and gradient descent. First, let
E be the complete edge set (not including redundant edges or
self loops) with m = | E |. Consider the incidence matrix E
associated with E and the vector of edge connectivities x, as
described in Section II-B. The constrained topology design
problem is then formulated as
P 1 : max
x,α
α, (1a)
subject to E(diag(x))E⊤  α In, (1b)
m∑
l=1
xl ≤ k + | E0 |, (1c)
x ∈ X , (1d)
xl = 1, l ∼ (i, j) ∈ E0, (1e)
xl ∈ {0, 1}, l ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. (1f)
In P 1, the solution α⋆ is precisely the value for λ2 of the
final Laplacian solution given by L(x⋆) = E(diag(x⋆))E⊤.
This is encoded in the constraint (1b), where the pseudo-
identity matrix In has the effect of filtering out the fixed
zero-eigenvalue of the Laplacian. A useful relation is λ2 =
inf
z
{z⊤L(x)z | z ⊥ 1n, ‖z‖2 = 1}, which shows that
λ2 as a function of x is a pointwise infimum of linear
functions of x and is therefore concave. By extension, P 1
is a concave-maximization problem in x. The set X is
assumed compact and convex and may be chosen by the
designer in accordance with problem constraints such as
bandwidth/memory limitations, restrictions on nodal degrees,
or restricting certain edges from being chosen. These con-
straints may manifest in applications such as communication
bandwidth limitations amongst Distributed Energy Resource
Providers for Real-Time Optimization in renewable energy
dispatch [4]. The binary constraint (1f) is nonconvex and
makes the problem NP-hard. Handling this constraint is one
of the main objectives of this paper and will be addressed in
Section IV.
As for existing methods of solving P 1, one option is
solve it over the convex hull of the constraint set, which
is given by [0, 1]m ∩ X . Then, the problem may be solved
in k steps by iteratively adding the edge l ∼ (i, j) for which
xl is maximal in each step. This is discussed in [8] and the
references therein. Although this method allows the designer
to easily capture X , it is not a satisfying relaxation because
the underlying characteristics of the connectivity are not well
captured. The authors of [8] propose an alternate method
which chooses the edge l for which
∂λ2
∂xl
= v⊤2
∂L(x)
∂xl
v2 =
v⊤2 ele
⊤
l v2 = (v2,i−v2,j)
2 is maximal. This method is limited
in that it is (a) greedy and (b) cannot account for X . We are
motivated to develop a relaxation for P 1 which improves on
existing techniques in both performance and the capability
of handling constraints.
B. Topology Design for Protecting Edges
We now formulate a problem which is closely related
to P 1 and interesting to study in its own right. Motivated
by the scenario of guarding against disruptive physical
disturbances or adversarial attacks, consider a coordinator
who may protect up to ks links from failing in a network.
The failure of the links are assumed to be independent
Bernoulli random variables whose probabilities are encoded
by the vector p ∈ [0, 1]m. Then, consider the coordinator’s
decision vector s ∈ S = {0, 1} ∩ S ′, where S ′ is assumed
compact and convex. We write out the Laplacian as before,
L(x) = E diag(x)E⊤. Following a disturbance or attack,
the probability that an edge l is (dis)connected is given
by P(xl ≡ 1) = (sl − 1)pl + 1 (resp. P(xl ≡ 0) =
(1−sl)pl). The interpretation for the vector s here is that, if
a particular element sl = 1, it is deterministically connected
and considered immune to the disturbance or attack. The
coordinator’s problem is:
P 2 : max
s,α
α, (2a)
subject to E
[
E(diag(x))E⊤
]
 α In, (2b)
P(xl ≡ 1) = (sl − 1)pl + 1, (2c)
P(xl ≡ 0) = (1− sl)pl, (2d)
m∑
l=1
sl ≤ ks, (2e)
s ∈ S,′ s ∈ {0, 1}m. (2f)
Due to the linearity of the expectation operator, (2b) is
equivalent to E(diag((s−1m)⋄p+1m))E⊤  α In, which
is an LMI (linear matrix inequality) in s. We note that, as in
P 1, the objective of P 2 may be thought of as a pointwise
infimum of linear functions and, as such, is a binary concave-
maximization problem in s.
The formulation in P 2 presupposes a fixed vector p.
However, it may be the case that a strategic attacker detects
preventive action taken by the coordinator and adjusts her
strategy to improve the likelihood of disconnecting the
network. We now formulate the attacker’s problem for some
known, fixed coordinator strategy s:
P 3 : min
p,α
α, (3a)
subject to λ2(E
[
E(diag(x))E⊤
]
) = α, (3b)
P(xl ≡ 1) = (sl − 1)pl + 1, (3c)
P(xl ≡ 0) = (1− sl)pl, (3d)
p ∈ P, p ∈ [0, 1]m. (3e)
Notice here that the optimization is instead over p, and
is now a minimization of α. The constraint (3b) is now
a nonlinear equality rather than an LMI, which manifests
itself from this being a concave-minimization problem. This
equality is not a convex constraint and will be addressed in
Section V. We assume P is compact and convex.
IV. AN SDP RELAXATION FOR TOPOLOGY DESIGN
This section aims to develop a relaxed approach to solve
P 1 in a computationally efficient manner. Ideally, such an
approach may also be straightforwardly extended to prob-
lems of the form P 2. To do this, we draw on intuition from
the randomized hyperplane strategy given in [10] for solving
the well-studied MAXCUT problem.
There are two notable differences between P 1 and MAX-
CUT: the entries of the decision vector in P 1 take values
in {0, 1}, whereas in MAXCUT, the decision (let’s say z)
takes values zi ∈ {−1, 1}. The latter is convenient because
it is equivalent to z2i = 1. Additionally, the enumeration
in MAXCUT is symmetric in the sense that, if z⋆ is a
solution, then so is −z⋆. However, P 1 is assymmetric in
the sense that, if x⋆ is a solution, it cannot be said that
−2x⋆ + 1m (effectively swapping the zeros and ones in the
elements of x⋆) is a solution. We rectify these issues with
a transformation and variable lift, respectively. Introduce a
vector y = 2x − 1m and notice x ∈ {0, 1}m maps to
y ∈ {−1, 1}m. Then, define Y = yy⊤ so that y2l = 1 may
be enforced via Yll = 1, l ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. In addition, define
Y˜ =
[
y
1
] [
y
1
]⊤
=
[
Y y
y⊤ 1
]
to capture the asymmetry in the
original variable x. Now, we are ready to reformulate P 1 as
an SDP in the variable y:
P 4 : max
Y,y,α
α, (4a)
subject to
1
2
E(diag(y) + Im)E
⊤  α In, (4b)
Y˜ =
[
Y y
y⊤ 1
]
 0, (4c)
rank (Y˜ ) = 1, (4d)
Y˜ll = 1, l ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, (4e)
y ∈ Y, (4f)
yl = 1, l ∼ (i, j) ∈ E0, (4g)
1
2
∑
i
(yi + 1) ≤ k + | E0 |, (4h)
where Y is an affine transformation on the set X in (1d), and
we have simply used the transformation and variable lift to
rewrite the other constraints. The problem P 4 is equivalent
to P 1: the NP-hardness now manifests itself in the nonlinear
constraint (4d). Dropping this constraint produces a relaxed
solution Y˜ ⋆ with the rank of Y˜ ⋆ not necessarily one.
This also produces a solution y⋆ which can be mapped
back to x⋆. Of course, x⋆ may not take binary values due
to the dropped rank constraint. We now briefly recall the
geometric intuition to approximate the solution to MAXCUT
in [10] with many technical details omitted here for brevity.
Let Z⋆ ∈ Rmz×mz be a rank rz solution to the rank-relaxed
MAXCUT SDP problem. Decompose Z⋆ = W⊤W with
W ∈ Rrz×mz , and notice the columns of W given by wi ∈
R
rz , i ∈ {1, . . . ,mz}, are vectors on the rz-dimensional unit
ball due to Z⋆ii = 1, i ∈ {1, . . . ,mz}. In order to determine a
solution z⋆ ∈ {−1, 1}mz , generate a uniformly random unit
vector p ∈ Rrz which may define a hyperplane. If the vector
wi lies on one side of the hyperplane, i.e. 〈wi, p〉 ≥ 0, set
the corresponding element zi = 1. If it is on the other side
of the hyperplane, 〈wi, p〉 < 0, set zi = −1. Geometrically
speaking, the stronger a vector wi is aligned with p, the
more “correlated” (for lack of a better term) node i is with
the set {j ∈ {1, . . . ,mz} | zj = 1} and vice-versa. From
another perspective, consider the case rz = 1 which implies
the solution is equivalent to the nonrelaxed problem. Then,
it can be seen that 〈wi, p〉 ∈ {−1, 1} and the approach gives
the exact optimizer for MAXCUT.
For our problem, decompose Y˜ ⋆ = U⊤U with U ∈
R
r×m+1, and obtain unit-vectors ul ∈ R
r, l ∈ {1, . . . ,m+
1}, from the columns of U . Because of the asymmetry of
our problem, we do not implement a random approach to
determine the solution. Instead, notice that the last column
um+1 is qualitatively different than ul, l ∈ {1, . . . ,m} due
to the variable lift. We have that yl = 〈ul, um+1〉, l ∈
{1, . . . ,m}. Thus, larger entries of yl correspond to vectors
ul on the unit ball which are more “aligned” with um+1,
which hearkens to the geometric intuition for the MAXCUT
solution and um+1 may be thought of as the vector p from
MAXCUT. The entries yl give a quantitative measure of the
effectiveness of adding edge l ∼ (i, j).
We suggest iteratively choosing the edge l associated with
the largest element of y for which l /∈ E0. If a particular
edge is infeasible, this is elegantly accounted for by (4f)
and is reflected in the relaxed solution to P 4. This approach
may be iterated k times, updating E0 and decrementing k
each time in accordance with (4h) to construct a satisfactory
solution to the original NP-hard binary problem. In addition,
this formulation is easily adaptable to solve P 2 via a similar
transformation and variable lift in s.
V. PROTECTING LINKS AGAINST AN ADVERSARY
This section begins by studying the Nash equilibria of a
game between the coordinator and attacker where they take
turns solving P 2 and P 3. We first study the (non)existence
of the Nash equilibria of this game, and use this result to
motivate the development of a preventive strategy for the
coordinator. We then provide some auxiliary results about
the solutions of P 3 and use these to justify methods for
finding such a preventive strategy.
A. Nash Equilibria
We begin by adopting the shorthand notation L(s, p) =
E
[
E(diag(x))E⊤
]
with x distributed as in (2c)–(2d), i.e.
Lij(s, p) = (1 − sl)pl − 1, l ∼ (i, j) ∈ E , i 6= j and
Lii(s, p) = −
∑
j∈N i
L(s, p)ij . This matrix may be inter-
preted as a weighted Laplacian whose elements are given by
the righthand side of (2c), (3c). We also adopt the shorthand
α(s, p) = inf
z
{z⊤L(s, p)z | z ⊥ 1n, ‖z‖2 = 1} to refer
to the Fiedler eigenvalue of L(s, p), and note that α(s, p),
as a pointwise infimum of bilinear functions, is concave-
concave in (s, p). From this, recall the first-order concavity
relation [3]
α(s2, p) ≤ α(s1, p) +∇sα(s
1, p)⊤(s2 − s1), ∀s1, s2 ∈ S,
α(s, p2) ≤ α(s, p1) +∇pα(s, p
1)⊤(p2 − p1), ∀p1, p2 ∈ P .
(5)
To get a better grasp on this, we compute the gradient of α
with respect to both s and p. Let v be the Fiedler eigenvector
associated with the second-smallest eigenvalue (in this case,
α) of L(s, p). Then,
∂α
∂sl
= v⊤
∂L(s, p)
∂sl
v,= v⊤plele
⊤
l v = pl(vi − vj)
2, (6)
which is a straightforward extension of the computation
shown near the end of Section III-A. Additionally,
∂α
∂pl
=
{
−(vi − vj)2, sl = 0
0, sl = 1.
(7)
The gradient with respect to s and p is a vector with elements
given by (6)–(7), which are nonnegative for s and nonpositive
for p. Also, note that v 6= 1n, v 6= 0, implying the quantity
(vi−vj)2 must be strictly positive for some edges l ∼ (i, j).
Now, consider a game where the coordinator and attacker
take turns solving and implementing the solutions of P 2 and
P 3, respectively. A Nash equilibrium is a point (s⋆, p⋆) with
the property
α(s, p⋆) ≤ α(s⋆, p⋆) ≤ α(s⋆, p), ∀s ∈ S, ∀p ∈ P , (8)
which is a stationary point of the aforementioned game. We
now state a lemma to motivate the remainder of this section.
Lemma 1. (Nonexistence of Nash Equilibrium). A Nash
equilibrium point (s⋆, p⋆) satisfying (8) is not guaranteed to
exist in general.
Proof. To show this result, we provide a simple counterex-
ample. Consider a complete graph with n = 3 nodes and
m = 3 edges, l ∈ {1, 2, 3} ∼ {(1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 3)} = E , and
the coordinator and attacker feasibility sets S = {0, 1}3 ∩
{s |
∑
l sl ≤ 2}, P = {p |
∑
l p ≤ 1}. We consider three
cases of the strategies (s, p) to show the nonexistence of a
Nash equilibrium here.
Case 1: The attacker play p⋆ is such that p⋆l = 1 for l such
that s⋆l = 1. This point violates the righthand side of (8). To
see this, notice ∃l′ 6= l s.t. s⋆l′ = 0 and that the play p
⋆′ with
p⋆′l′ = 1 is optimal for P 3.
Case 2: The attacker play p⋆l is such that p
⋆
l = 1 for l such
that s⋆l = 0. This point violates the lefthand side of (8), and
the coordinator recomputes an optimal play s⋆′ with s⋆′l = 1.
Case 3: The attacker play p⋆ is such that ∄l with p⋆l = 1.
This point violates the righthandside of (8) and the attacker
recomputes an optimal play p⋆′ with p⋆′l = 1 for the l
corresponding to s⋆l = 0.
The simple counterexample employed in the proof of
Lemma 1 suggests that Nash equilibria are also unlikely to
exist in more meaningful scenarios. This result should not
come as a surprise: the solutions to P 2 and P 3 are in direct
conflict with one another, and playing sequentially has the
effect of the coordinator “chasing” the attacker around the
network. We find that the cases for which we can construct
a Nash equilibrium are trivial: for example, if 1m ∈ S , the
coordinator may choose s⋆ = 1m, and the attacker’s solution
set is trivially the whole set P with the interpretation that the
attacker is powerless to affect the value of α. Then, (1m, p)
are Nash equilibria ∀p ∈ P , and are not interesting.
B. Coordinator’s Preventive Strategy
Lemma 1 motivates the study of an optimal preventive
strategy for the coordinator under the assumption that the
attacker may always make a play in response to the coordi-
nator’s action. Instead of a Nash equilibrium satisfying (8),
we seek a point (s⋆, p⋆) satisfying the following:
(s⋆, p⋆) = argmax
s∈S
argmin
p∈P
α(s, p). (9)
The interpretation of s⋆ solving (9) is that it provides the
best-case solution for the coordinator given that the attacker
makes the last play. In this sense, s⋆ is not optimal for p⋆;
rather, it is an optimal play with respect to the whole set P .
From the coordinator’s perspective, the objective function
argmin
p∈P
α(s, p) is a pointwise infimum of concave functions
of s, and therefore the problem is a concave maximization.
However, computing such a point may be dubious in practice,
particularly since we have not assumed the coordinator has
the capability of solving the concave minimization problem
P 3 or even knowledge of P . It would, however, be conve-
nient to use the attacker’s solutions to P 3 against herself.
To do this, we establish some lemmas to gain insight on the
solution sets of the attacker. This helps us construct heuristics
for computing s⋆ in the sense of (9). We assume S,P 6= ∅.
Lemma 2. (Attacker’s Solution Tends to be Noninterior).
Consider the set of solutions P⋆ ⊆ P to P 3 for some s. If
there exists point p⋆ ∈ P⋆ which is an interior point of P ,
then P⋆ = P .
Proof. Consider p⋆ ∈ P⋆ which is an interior point of P .
Pick ε > 0 so Bε(p⋆) ⊆ P . From (5), the point p′ = p⋆ −
ε∇pα(s, p⋆)/‖∇pα(s, p⋆)‖2 ∈ P violates the condition that
p⋆ is a solution to P 3 unless ∇pα(s, p⋆) = 0m, so this must
be the case. Then, in accordance with (5), all p ∈ P are
solutions, and the statement P⋆ = P follows.
This lemma implies the solution set P⋆ consists of nonin-
terior point(s) of P except in trivial cases. We now provide
a stronger result in the case where P is a polytope, which
shows that solutions tend to be contained in low-dimensional
faces of P such as edges (line segments) and vertices.
Lemma 3. (Attacker’s Solutions Tend Towards Low-
Dimensional Faces). Let P = A1 ∩ · · · ∩ Ar ⊂ R
m be a
compact polytope with half-spaces Ai characterized by ai, bi
for i ∈ {1, . . . , r}, and let F be a face of P with a⊤j p = bj
for j ∈ J ⊆ {1, . . . , r}, ∀p ∈ F . If a point p⋆ ∈ relint (F)
is a solution to P 3, then ∇pα(s, p⋆) ∈ span{aj}j∈J .
Proof. Suppose that ∇pα(s, p⋆) /∈ span{aj}j∈J and de-
compose ∇pα(s, p⋆) = β + ζ, β ∈ span{aj}j∈J , ζ ∈
span{aj}⊥j∈J , ζ 6= 0m. Now consider the point p
′ = p⋆ −
εζ/‖ζ‖2 ∈ F for some ε > 0. From (5), we have the relation
α(s, p′) ≤ α(s, p⋆)−ε‖ζ‖2 with ε > 0 and ‖ζ‖2 > 0, which
contradicts p⋆ being a solution and completes the proof.
To interpret the result of Lemma 3, notice that p ∈
relint (F) implies p does not belong to a lower dimensional
face, and that the the dimension of span{aj}j∈J becomes
large only as the dimension of F becomes small. This
intuitively suggests that the gradient of α at p⋆ may only
belong to span{aj}j∈J for a p ∈ F if this span is large in
dimension. This allows us to conservatively characterize the
solution set P⋆, and the result gives credence to the notion
that solutions take values in low-dimensional faces of P .
It is our intent to use Lemmas 2 and 3 to establish intuition
for the problem and justify solution strategies to the hard
problem of computing a preventive s⋆. Before proceeding,
we establish one more simple lemma and provide discussion
on deterministically connected graphs.
Lemma 4. (Deterministic Connectivity). Assume ∃p ∈ P
with p ≻ 0m and that the attacker makes the last play.
Let L(x) indicate the random matrix whose elements are
distributed as in (3c)–(3d). Then, a coordinator’s strategy
s gives λ2 > 0 of L(x) with probability 1 if and only if
the elements of s equal to 1 are associated with edges of a
connected graph.
Proof. ⇒) We do not need to assume the attacker has made
an optimal play with respect to P 3. Instead, consider any
play p ≻ 0m and note that each edge l associated with sl =
0 has a nonzero probability of being disconnected. Then,
there is a nonzero probability that xl = 0 for each l with
sl = 0, and the remaining protected edges do not form a
connected graph. Then, if the elements of s equal to one are
not associated edges defining a connected graph, λ2 = 0 is
an event with nonzero probability.
⇐) This direction is trivial: xl = 1 with probability 1
for edges l corresponding to sl = 1. If these edges form a
connected graph, then λ2 > 0 with probability 1.
The consequence of Lemma 4 is obvious: if the coordina-
tor does not have the resources to protect edges which form
a connected graph and the attacker targets all edges, then
there is no guarantee the resulting graph will be connected.
A subject of future work is to provide some insight on the
lower bound of λ2 for particular cases of S and P .
C. Heuristics for Computing a Preventive Strategy
Recall from the previous subsection that the goal is to
compute s⋆ as a solution to (9). In this subsection, we de-
scribe three approaches to computing a satisfactory solution
and formally adopt the following assumptions.
Assumption 1. (Coordinator’s Problem is Solvable). Given
a known vector p, the coordinator can find the optimal
solution of P 2.
Assumption 2. (Attacker Plays Optimally and Last). The
attacker’s play p belongs to a convex, compact set P . In
addition, she always makes optimal plays which solve P 3
given the coordinator’s play s, and she may always play in
response to the coordinator changing his decision.
Assumption 3. (Available Information). The coordinator is
cognizant of Assumption 2 and has access to the current
attacker play p. He may compute α(s, p) for a particular
play (s, p).
Assumption 4. (Only Last Play Matters). The objective
α(s, p) (and, by extension, λ2) is only consequential once
both the coordinator and attacker have chosen their final
strategy and do not make additional plays.
We now construct three heuristics for computing s⋆, the
latter two of which observe the attacker plays p(t) over a time
horizon t ∈ {1, . . . , T } and iteratively construct a solution.
Algorithm 1 Random Sampling
1: procedure RAND(S, E , T )
2: Compute (vi − vj)
2 for each l ∼ (i, j) ∈ E
3: for t = 1, . . . , T do
4: M← {1, . . . ,m}
5: s(t)← 0m
6: done ← false
7: while done = false do
8: Choose l ∈ M uniformly randomly
9: if sl(t)← 1⇒ s(t) ∈ S then
10: sl(t)← 1
11: end if
12: M←M\ {l}
13: if ∄l ∈ M s.t. sl(t)← 1⇒ s(t) ∈ S then
14: done = true
15: end if
16: end while
17: Play s(t)
18: Store s(t) and α(s(t), p(t))
19: end for
20: t⋆ ← argmax
t
α(s(t), p(t))
21: return s⋆ = s(t⋆)
22: end procedure
Algorithm 1 is simple and doesn’t utilize the attacker’s
plays. For each t, it constructs s(t) by picking edges uni-
formly randomly. Each loop terminates when no feasible
edges remain. The value of α is recorded following the
attacker’s response p(t), and the best s(t) is returned.
Algorithm 2 utilizes a convex weighting function η such
that
∑t
k=1η(k)=1. We suggest three possible choices for η:
η1(k) = 1/t,
η2(k) =
γ(t−k)∑
k γ
(t−k)
, γ ∈ (0, 1),
η3(k) =
α(s(k), p(k))∑
k α(s(k), p(k))
.
These may be interpreted as a uniform weighting of each
observation p(t), a recency-biased weighting, and a penalty-
biased weighting, respectively. Algorithm 2 is motivated by
a few observations. Firstly, recall Lemmas 1–3 and note that
p(t) may jump around extreme points of P as s(t) evolves.
Successive convex combinations of the solutions p(t) effec-
tively push the coordinator’s decision towards responding to
the vulnerable parts of the space over time.
Algorithm 3 adopts the following stronger version of
Assumption 1.
Algorithm 2 Convex Combinations
Require: Convex weighting function η with
∑t
k=1 η(k) = 1
1: procedure CVX(S, E , T )
2: s(1)← 0m
3: Store s(1), p(1) and α(s(1), p(1))
4: pθ(1)← p(1)
5: for t = 2, . . . , T do
6: s(t)← argmax
s∈S
α(s, pθ(t− 1))
7: Store s(t), p(t), and α(s(t), p(t))
8: for k = 1, . . . , t do
9: θ(k)← η(k)
10: end for
11: pθ(t)←
∑t
k=1 θ(k)p(k)
12: end for
13: t⋆ ← argmax
t
α(s(t), p(t))
14: return s⋆ = s(t⋆)
15: end procedure
Assumption 5. (Coordinator’s Problem is Solvable Over
Finitely-Many Points). Given a finite set of points
P ⊂ P , the coordinator may compute the solution
s⋆ = argmax
s∈S
min
p∈P
α(s, p).
Algorithm 3 Constructing P via Pointwise Search
1: procedure SEARCH(S, E , T )
2: s(1)← 0m
3: Store s(1), p(1), and α(s(1), p(1))
4: P ← p(1)
5: for t = 2, . . . , T do
6: s(t)← argmax
s∈S
min
p∈P
α(s, p)
7: Store s(t), p(t) and α(s(t), p(t))
8: P ← P ∪ {p(t)}
9: end for
10: t⋆ ← argmax
t
α(s(t), p(t))
11: return s⋆ = s(t⋆)
12: end procedure
Algorithm 3 operates by computing the solution s(t) as the
optimal play with respect to each of the previous attacker
plays p(k), k < t. Although it is more computationally
demanding than Algorithms 1 and 2, it is strongly rooted
in the theoretical understanding of the problem we have
developed in the following sense: the convex hull of these
points co(P) at time t is a compact polytope whose vertices
are defined by the points p(k). Applying Lemma 3, it
stands to reason that points in the interior or in higher-
dimensional faces of co(P) are uncommon solutions. We
expect co(P) to grow in each loop of the algorithm and
effectively reconstruct the attacker’s feasibility set P . For
now, convergence to the true s⋆ is not guaranteed due to the
difficulty of characterizing the evolution of ∇pα(s, p) with
p. However, we note in simulation studies that Algorithm 3
converges to the global optimizer in a few iterations. Finally,
we state the following trivial lemma for completeness.
Lemma 5. (Nondecreasing Performance of Algorithms 1–
3). Let p⋆ solve P 3 for s = s⋆(T ), where s⋆(T ) is the
returned strategy of Algorithm 1, 2, or 3 truncated at time
T . For all T > 1, α(s⋆(T ), p⋆) ≥ α(s⋆(T − 1), p⋆).
Proof. The result is trivially seen in that s⋆(T ) = s(t⋆), t⋆ =
argmax
t∈{1,...,T}
α(s(t), p(t)) and {1, . . . , T − 1} ⊂ {1, . . . , T }.
VI. SIMULATIONS
We now examine our proposed SDP relaxation for solving
P 1. For the ease of comparison with the Fiedler vector
heuristic given in [8], we do not include any additional
convex constraints beyond (1c). For a network with 14 nodes,
| E0 | = 28 initial edges generated randomly, we implement
the Fiedler method, our SDP method, and the approach
of taking the convex hull of the feasibility set of P 1. We
compute 100 trials with different topology initializations for
each of the k ∈ {25, 40} edge-addition cases. Our SDP
design outperforms the Fiedler vector heuristic in 75 trials
for the k = 25 case, 80 trials for the k = 40 case, and it
outperforms the convex hull approach in all 100 trials of both
cases. This improved performance is observed over a variety
of network sizes and initial connectivities, and we observe
that increasing k increases the likelihood that our method
outperforms the alternatives.
One such instance of k = 25 added edges is plotted in
Figure 1 and the performance is plotted in Figure 2. Firstly,
note that both our SDP method and the Fiedler vector method
greatly outperform the simple convex hull approach. Our
SDP method is outperformed by the Fiedler method in early
iterations. In later iterations, the performance of our method
catches up with and surpasses the Fiedler vector heuristic
(this is common behavior across other initializations). We
contend that the reason for this is that the relaxed solution
of P 4 at each iteration is cognizant of the entire problem
horizon, as opposed to the Fiedler vector heuristic which
greedily chooses edges in accordance with the direction of
steepest ascent in λ2.
Next, we study a small network of 7 nodes and 11 edges
so that the solutions to P 2 and P 3 may be brute-forcibly
computed to test Algorithms 1–3, with η1(k) being used for
Algorithm 2. We choose P = [0.25, 0.75]11 ∩ {p |
∑
l pl ≤
4.25} and S = {0, 1}11 ∩ {s |
∑
l sl ≤ 5}. We run the
algorithms for T = 30 iterations and plot the results at each
iteration in Figure 3.
Clearly, Algorithm 1 does not improve across iterations
as it does not utilize information about the attacker’s plays
from previous iterations, and it achieves a maximum value
of α(s(t⋆), p(t⋆)) = 0.8175, which is a bit below the
global optimum α(s⋆, p⋆) = 0.8762. Algorithm 2 achieves
the global optimum α(s(t⋆), p(t⋆)) = 0.8762 the fastest,
at t⋆ = 5, although it never reaches this point again and
instead oscillates around suboptimal points, indicating that
optimality may not be reliably attained in general. Counter-
intuitively, the performance of Algorithm 3 does not improve
Fig. 1. Initial topology of 14 nodes and 28 edges. Three methods are
implemented to grow the network to 53 edges, with the additional edges
plotted as red dotted lines.
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Fig. 2. Performance each method over k = 25 iterations.
monotonically in t, although this should be expected: early
solutions s(t) may get “lucky”, in some sense, but the
subsequent iteration may allow the attacker to jump to a new
vulnerable part of the space. Once the algorithm achieves
the global optimum at t⋆ = 9, it does not dip below this for
the remainder of the time horizon. Finally, we note that the
behavior of each algorithm observed here is typical when
implemented on other small graphs.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper introduced three related problems motivated
by studying the algebraic connectivity of a graph by adding
edges to an initial topology or protecting edges under the
case of a disturbance or attack on the network. We developed
a novel SDP relaxation to address the NP-hardness of the
design and demonstrated in simulation that it is superior to
existing methods which are greedy and cannot accommodate
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Fig. 3. Performance of Algorithms 1–3 at each loop t.
general constraints. In addition, we studied the dynamics of
the game that may be played between a network coordinator
and strategic attacker. We developed the notion of an optimal
preventive solution for the coordinator and proposed effective
heuristics to find such a solution guided by characterizations
of the solutions to the attacker’s problem. Future work in-
cludes characterizing the performance of our SDP relaxation
and developing an algorithm which provably converges to
the optimal preventive strategy.
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